Abstract: Ladder tournaments are widely used to rank individuals in real-world organizations and games. Their mathematical properties however are still poorly understood. We formalize the ranking rule generated by a ladder tournament, and we show that it is neither complete nor transitive in general. If it is complete, then it is transitive and its asymmetric component is a finite union of transitive tournaments. We also study the relationship between an individual's rank and his performance as measured by the frequency at which he is pivotal. We show an individual's pivotability is a weakly increasing function of his rank.
Introduction
This paper studies the mathematical properties of a game ladder involving a finite number of vertices or players. Players are listed as if on the rungs of a ladder, and they compete against each other for higher-ranked positions. Each player challenges each of the players above him on the ladder, and if the lower-placed player wins, then the two players swap positions on the ladder. The game goes on until no lower-placed player wins a challenge against a higher-placed player. This tournament model is used in real-life organizations to make decisions on hiring, firing, and promotion.
We model a game ladder as a hierarchical organization (N, T, f ) where N is a non-empty finite set of vertices or players, T = {1, ..., j} an ordered finite set of position types with cardinility |T | = j ≥ 2, and f : T N −→ R a real-valued production function measuring organizational performance. Positions are ordered in degree of importance, where type 1 positions are less important than type 2 positions, type 2 positions less important than type 3 position, and so on. We assume that the organization is monotonic in that for any position profiles x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) and z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) such that x ≤ z, f (x) ≤ f (z). In any position profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , .., x n ) ∈ T N , x i denotes the position of player i.
In a game ladder, players compete for more higher-level positions as follows. Consider two players p and q in an organization. Player p occupies a position indexed s and player q occupies a position indexed r, where s is a lower-level position than r. We say that p beats q in position r relative to position s, denoted p (r,s) q, if aggregate output increases as a result of swapping p and q no matter how the other members of the organization are allocated to the different positions. If p beats q in each position relative to positions that are lower-ranked, we say that p is globally more influential or productive than q, and this is denoted by p q.
Our goal is to study some mathematical properties of the global influence relation . We find that this relation is not transitive in general. However, if it is complete, it is transitive and its asymmetric component ≻ is a finite union of transitive tournaments (that is, ≻ is a finite unions of complete, asymmetric, and transitive binary relations).
We note that the global influence relation coincides with the replacement relation introduced by Isbell (1958) for games that have only two layers. However, the properties of for games which have more than two layers are quite different the properties of for games that have only two layers.
In fact, when there are only two layers, is transitive (see, e.g., Taylor and Zwicker (1999) ), which contrasts with the finding we obtain when there are more than two layers.
We also examine whether the relation predicts the frequency with which a player is pivotal in the game. The notion of pivotability was introduced by Freixas (2005b) . We show that a more globally influential player is (weakly) more likely to be pivotal.
The next section shows how the ranking rule is generated through the game ladder. Section 3 studies its mathematical properties and concludes.
Ladder Tournament
A ladder tournament in a game (N, T, f ) is a system of challenges that proceeds as follows. Let r and s be two positions occupied by players p and q, respectively, where r is more important than s. We say that p beats q in position r relative to position s, denoted by p (r,s) q, if swapping the
2) k i is proved in the same manner as the proof of i k, and we conclude that i ∼ k.
Our second result says that the relation is not complete in general, which implies that is not a tournament (a tournament is a binary relation that is complete and asymmetric).
Proposition 2 The relation is not complete in general.
Proof. Consider the following game ladder where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, T = {1, 2, 3}, and f is defined as follows:
For any profile x, f (x) = 1 if there exists y ∈ I such that x ≤ y 0 if not where I = {(3, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2, 2)}.
It can be easily checked that 1 and 3 are not comparable.
Our third result says that the relation is not transitive in general.
Proposition 3 The relation is not transitive in general.
Proof. Consider the same game as in the proof of Proposition 2. It can be easily checked that 1 ≻ 2, 2 ≻ 3, but not(1 ≻ 3) given that 1 and 3 are not comparable.
Our fourth result states that the global influence relation is transitive if is complete.
Proposition 4 Let (N, T, f ) be a linear game ladder. Then is transitive.
Proof. Let (N, T, f ) be a linear game ladder, and i, j and k be three players such that i j and j k. We will show that i k. We distinguish two cases.
1) Assume that not(k i). Then i ≻ k since (N, T, f ) is linear, and this implies that i k.
2) Assume that k i : we shall show that in this condition, k i.
Let exist s, r ∈ T such that r > s, and x ∈ T N such that
We need to show that f (x + (r − s)e k ) ≤ f (x + (r − s)e i ).
As in Proposition 1, we denote by x * the profile such that
Then, x = x * u + se i + se k + te j and
We shall distinguish five cases as we did in Proposition 1.
Tournament Rank and Pivotability
In this section, we study the relationship between tournament rank, given by the relation , and pivotability as defined by Freixas (2005a) . Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, and {z 1 , z 2 , ..., z k } the range of f . Without loss of generality, we assume z 1 > z 2 > ... > z k . Denote by Q N the set of all the bijections defined from N onto {1, ..., n}. An element of Q N is a possible order in which players entire the game or the organization (players move from a type 1 task to another position type or they stay in 1). An ordered allocation of positions of N is an ordered pair R = sR, x R , where sR ∈ Q N and x R ∈ T N .
The i-pivotal player of R for i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1, denoted by i-piv(R, f ), is uniquely defined either as:
(a): the player whose action in R clinches the outcome of x R under at least the output level z i , or (b): the player whose action in R clinches the outcome of x R under at most the output level z i+1 .
In other words, i-piv(R, f ) is the first player in sR who satisfies one of the two following mutually exclusive conditions:
(1) independently of how tasks are allocated among all subsequent players, the outcome will be
(2) no matter how all subsequent players were to change their actions, the final outcome would be no greater than f i+1 .
For every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1}, denote by R + ip (f ) the set of all the ordered allocation of positionss for which player p is i-pivotal.
We answer the question of whether the frequency with which a player is pivotal reflects tournament rank. I Theorem 2 Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, and p, q ∈ N two players. Then, p q =⇒ R
The proof of Theorem 2 is quite involved and is presented in Section 3.3. This theorem proves that a player's pivotability is a weakly increasing function of his tournament rank, which justifies the use of tournament in organizations.
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, a few definitions and five preliminary results will be needed.
Preliminary Definitions and Results for the Proof of Theorem 2
Let R = sR, x R be an ordered allocation of positions. Let p be a player. R 
is the ordered allocation of positions in which the order in which players enter the organization coincides with that of R (i.e. sR 1 p = sR) and player p as well as any player q who enters before p occupies the exact same position as in R (i.e. x
whereas players who enter after p are assigned the lowest position (i.e. x 
the ordered allocation of positions defined by:
denotes the set of all the ordered allocation of positionss for which player p is i-pivotal. We pose:
We also define the notion of agreement between two ordered allocations of positions. Let R = (sR, x R ) and R ′ = (sR ′ , x R ′ ) two ordered allocations of positions in a game ladder (N, T, f ), and let p be a player. We say that R and R ′ agree up to the player p if the order in which the players enter is the same for R and R ′ (i.e. sR = sR ′ ) and p as well as any player who enters before him occupies the same position in R
Formally, R and R ′ agree up to the player p if sR = sR ′ and q ≤ sR (p)
. We denote by A (R, p) the set of all ordered allocations of positions which agree with R up to p.
The following remark is important.
Remark 1 Let R be an ordered allocation of positions. ∀R
Denote by prec (p, sR) the player who enters the organization right before player p in an ordered allocation of positions R. We remark that the definition of a i-pivotal player can be stated as follows:
The following lemma provides a full characterization of R
Lemma 1 Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, p a player, R an ordered allocation of positions, and
Proof. =⇒) Suppose that R ∈ R + ip (f ) and let us show the following:
Two cases are possible : sR (p) = 1 and sR (p) = 1
• If
Let the ordered allocation of positions R 1 = sR 1 , x R 1 be such that
We have
Let the ordered allocation of positions R 2 = sR 2 , x R 2 be such that
We have, by definition of R 2 and R ′
It follows that
Case 2 : sR (p) = 1.
•
, and we have
We know that there exists a task profile
Given that for any y ∈ T N , the following inequality holds
and by monotonicity, we have
We know that there exists a task profile x such that f (x) = z 1 .
Suppose that f (x
Then, given that for any y ∈ T N , the following inequality holds
we have
and by monotonicity,
That is,
And therefore, we have z 1 < z i , which is contradictory since z 1 ≥ z i . Hence
We conclude that
and let us show that R ∈ R + ip (f ). We shall consider two cases : sR (p) = 1 and sR (p) = 1.
, then since for all R ′ ∈ A (R, p), we have , it follows by monotonicity that .
it follows by monotonicity that
It suffices to consider R ′ = (sR ′ , x R ′ ) with sR ′ = sR and
This ends the proof for Case 1.
It follows by monotonicity that:
, since for all R ′ ∈ A (R, p), we have
It follows by monotonicity that
We deduce that for all R ′ ∈ A (R, p),
We therefore conclude that R ∈ R
The following notation is useful.
Notation 2 Let R = sR, x R be an ordered allocation of positions. We denote respectively by R pq and R 0 pq the following ordered allocation of positionss:
We have the following remark.
Remark 2 Let R = sR, x R be an ordered allocation of positions, p, q ∈ N : x R p = r and s = x R q . 1) If sR (p) < sR (q), then,
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 2 Let (N, T f ) be a game ladder, and p, q ∈ N two players. If R and R ′ are two ordered allocation of positionss such that R = R ′ , then R 0 pq = R ′0 pq and R pq = R ′ pq .
Lemmas 4 and 5 below will also be useful.
Lemma 3 Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N two players such that p q, and R = sR, x R an ordered allocation of positions such that R ∈ R
Proof
Hence
Let us show that f x
We have:
it follows that:
Therefore:
We therefore have:
Since p q, we have
2) Suppose that sR (p) > sR (q) and let us show that R pq ∈ R + ip (f ). Il suffices to show that:
By assumption, we have:
Since p q, we have:
We therefore have
which implies:
We also have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N two players such that p q, and R = sR, x R an ordered allocation of positions such that R ∈ R
Proof. 1) Suppose that sR (p) < sR (q) and x R p = r > s = x R q . Let us show that R pq ∈ R + ip (f ), that is:
Since p q, it follows that:
But:
• Suppose f (x
or equivalently
• If f (x
That is
We then have
2) Suppose sR (p) > sR (q) and let us show that R pq ∈ R + ip (f ), that is:
By assumption, we have
which implies
Given that p q, we have
We then obtain that:
from which it follows that
In the sequel, given a ∈ N , i ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}, we define the following sets:
The following lemma is needed.
Lemma 5 Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N two players such that p q, and R an ordered allocation of positions such that R ∈ R
Proof. Let (N, T, f ) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N and R an ordered allocation of positions such that sR (p) < sR (q) and R ∈ R + iq .
1) Suppose
and let us show that R 0 pq ∈ R + ip . It suffices to show that:
Let us show that
with p and q being assigned to the same task s in the task profile
by monotonicity, we have
Given that
and let us show that R 0 pq ∈ R + ip . Since
By monotonicity, we have
that is,
Therefore, we have
and let us show that R 0
with p and q being assigned to the task s in the task profile x
in the task profile x
p )e p , with p and q are assigned to the same task s. Since p q and
and let us show that R 0 pq ∈ R − ip . Since
We have by monotonicity
From p q, we have
Therefore
For the sequel, for any p, q ∈ N , we define the following sets: 
The table above gives the value ψ pq (R) of R depending on how x R p and x R q compare. We note that ψ pq is well defined. This indeed follows from Lemmas 2-5. Let now show that ψ pq is injective.
Remark that for any R ∈ R + iq , it is the case that ψ pq (R) ∈ {R 0 pq , R pq }. Let R, R ′ ∈ R + iq such that R = R ′ . Let us show that ψ pq (R) = ψ pq (R ′ ).
• If sR = sR ′ , then sR 0 pq = sR ′0 pq , sR 0 pq = sR ′ pq , sR pq = sR ′0 pq and sR pq = sR ′ pq . It follows that R 0 pq = R ′0 pq , R 0 pq = R ′ pq , R pq = R ′0 pq , and R pq = R ′ pq ; hence ψ pq (R) = ψ pq (R ′ ).
• If sR = sR ′ and x R = x R ′ , we consider the following two cases: Hence ψ pq (R) = ψ pq R ′ .
Case 2: For all player b ∈ N \ {p, q}, x R b = x R ′ b . This case has three subcases i), ii) and iii) below.
i) If x R p = x R ′ p and x R q = x R ′ q , then R 0 pq = R ′0 pq and R pq = R ′ pq .
• If x R ′ q = x R p , since • If x R ′ q = x R p and x R q = x R p , then, given that • If sR (p) < sR (q) , then ψ pq (R) = R 0 pq and ψ pq (R ′ ) = R ′0 pq , that is, ψ pq (R) = ψ pq (R ′ ) because R 0 pq = R ′0 pq .
• If sR (p) > sR (q), then ψ pq (R) = R pq and ψ pq (R ′ ) = R ′ pq , that is, ψ pq (R) = ψ pq (R ′ ) because R pq = R ′ pq .
We conclude that for any R, R ′ ∈ R + iq such that R = R ′ , ψ pq (R) = ψ pq (R ′ ), that is, ψ pq is injective, which implies that R + ip ≥ R + iq .
